Much of the new growth literature stresses countly characteristics, such as education levels or political stability, as the dominant determinant of growth. However, growth rates are highly unstable over time, with a correlation across decades of .1 to .3, while country characteristics are stable, with cross-decade correlations of .6 to .9. Shocks, especially those to terms of trade, play a large role in explaining variance in growth. These findings suggest either that shocks are important relative to country characteristics in determining long-run growth, or that worldwide technological change determines long-run growth while country characteristics determine relative income levels.
Introduction
Much of the new growth literature stresses country characteristics as the dominant determinant of growth performance. A vast empirical literature tests the effects of country characteristics on growth.' This paper presents a fact suggesting the emphasis on country characteristics is misguided: growth rates are highly unstable over time, while country characteristics are highly persistent. The correlation across decades of countries' growth rates of income per capita is around .1(0 .3. while most country characteristics display cross-decade correlations of .6 to .9. Correlations of growth across periods as long as two decades -period lengths comparable to those used in the cross-section empirical literature -are similarly low. With a few famous exceptions, the same countries do not do well period after period; countries are 'success stories' one period and disappointments the next.
The low persistence of growth rates reconciles the enormous variation in growth rates across countries with the remarkable stability of relative incomes across countries. For each of the last two decades the standard deviation of growth rates has been over 2.5, nearly the growth difference between Japan and the US. Yet the correlation of (Summers and Heston (1991) ) GDP per capita in 1960 and 1988 was .92 . Even more striking the rank correlation of GDP per capita for the 28 countries for which Maddison (1989) has data is .82 over . Major changes in country income ranldngs would have required large persistent differences in growth rwts; in the event, income rankings did not change much and only a small fraction of the growth differences between countries were persistent.
Among the counny ch cicflsdca this Ilicrasot cuisines ale policies affecisag the price or quanety of equipnient Invesuneit (Do Long and Summers (1991 , polEles aflcciing rnseaith and dentopmenn (Romef (1989 (Romef ( .1990 ), inveignenl in physical capial (Romer (1986 (Romer ( . 1991 ) huisin capinll (Lucai (1988) . Bum (1991) . Bonn and Lee (1993) ). mmii inco (Basis (1991) ). distorsonary policy esvtrvnmems (Murpfly. Shleifer. sod vishny (l991). Easierly (1993) ). government spending (Basis (1990) . isa policy (King au Rebolo (1990) . Jones vii Manaelli(1990) ). rii policy (King and Levine (1993) . Levine (1991) . Oseenwood and Jovanovic (1990) .
0db ((989) ). trade policy (Youii (1991) . Grossman and Helpinin (1991) . Riveit Bonn sod Romer (1991) . Horniest (1991) ). alconsi d,smbuaon (Alesins and Rodrik (199) ), Perasoca and Tabellini (1991) ), macroeconomic policy (Fischer (1991 (Fischer ( . 1993 ) and even ediiucuy (Bor)as ( (992)), legal inseiwdoni (North (1989) ) and teligioa (Dc Long (1988) ). This paper has three sections and a conclusion. The first section presents the basic facts about persistence of cross country growth differences and of country characteristics. The second section attempts to identify the temporary shocks important in explaining low persistence of growth rates across decades. The third section interprets low persistence under two types of growth models: models in which country characteristics determine long-run growth rates and models in which country characteristics determine relative levels of steady state income and long-run growth rates are determined by worldwide technological change. A conclusion summarizes the results.
I) Low Persistence of Growth Rate DilTerences Across Countries (a) Bcic facts
The persistence of growth rate differences across countries, even over long periods, is low. 1970-79 and 1980-88 73 and 1974-88. The dotted lines show the averages in each period. A large portion of the sample is contained in the off-diagonal quadrants: above-average in 1960-73 and below average in 1974-88, or vice versa. The rank correlation is 21 in the figure. 'The dam on real GOP per worker is iakesi from the Penn World TablesMark 5 of Summers and Hesmon (1991) . We obiau similar renilo using World Bank dam on growth rows of owpee perworkervalued ii comomea local pnces.RumdO iso alto similar with GOP per capiw: we used GOP per worker sara is is a bewse aure of preducuvity change. The use of the lease-squares growth rue reduces the sonsmoviry in end-poino: conventional cosirpowal growth iown iso even less peroisinsa. We have a prrofl occluded high-income od exporTers. i.e. Kuwait aid Saudi Arabia. because their growth depends enorely on varwsona in oil production. Including Kuwaie would raise peraisreere (To about .35) because it has irkingly aeganve growth in all periods.
'Others who have previously nosed dim iodide De Long and Suounero (1991) . Levine and Rutsok (1991). and Fitcher (1987) . Qush (I 993) hat recendy proseneeda sunilar finding, nombly the insiabiliry of growth across penoda in Markov Transition maresces.
The boxes in the corners represent the deciles of the period growth rates. The northeast box represents countries with growth in the top deciles in both periods. The southwest box shows the countries persistently in the bottom decile. The northeast box (persistent success) contains Botswana and the famous Asian Gang of Four (Hong Kong is actually just short of being in the top decile in the tirst period). The East Asian success story is well Imown, while Botswana has benefitted from extensive diamond mines and from a democratic government that has avoided some of its neighbors' economic mistakes. The widespread perception of strong country effects in growth is strongly influenced by the Gang of Four; without them and Botswana, the already low correlation of growth rates between periods is cut in half. In contrast, persistence is not raised much by deleting a small number of outliers.
Persistence is also low for several subsamples of countries. The second, third and fourth rows of Table 1 show the correlations for non-oil countries, the OECD countries, and the non-oil developing countries. The only exception is a high correlation between the 60's and 70's in the small sample of OECD countries, but this reverts to zero between the 70's and 80's. Figure 2 shows that persistence stays low at various period lengths in the postwar data. This is confirmed by partial data on long-run growth rates for 30 year periods over 1870-1988'. We have a total of 54 observations for 23 OECD and Latin American countries. Figure 3 shows growth plotted against lagged growth for these 30 year periods. Portugal is illustrative: decent growth in 1870-99, negative growth in 1900-29, average growth in 1930-59. and one of the highest growth rates in 1960- ' We have calculaced the Iesat..quaii growth rum of per capim incoren dam borrowed from EesrrIy ted RebelO (1993) . who use muurJy Maddison (1959) . it need baldly be mid this tha dam u even more subjec* is error than the recent dam. untiuding error! asaoduced by esreapolenon over long persodu.
88. The correlation of 30-year per capita growth with per capita growth in the previous 30 year period in this data is only .l2.
One possible explanation for low persistence in the recent data is instability in agriculture due to price and weather shocks. Figure 4 shows persistence coefficients for growth of value added per worker in agriculture, industry, and services. The rank persistence of agriculture is zero between the 70s and 80s and is low between the 60s and 70s. However, industry and services also have low persistence. Table 2 shows the low contemporaneous correlations of growth rates across sectors (with the exception of services in the 70s, when it had about a one-half correlation with both industry and agriculture). The low correlations could mean that shocks to individual sectors, such as relative price movements that pull factors like capital and skilled entrepreneurs out of one sector and into others, are more important than shocks affecting all sectors, such as increases in economy-wide human capital.6 However, another explanation for low cross-sector correlations could be that even economy-wide shocks cause sectoral shifts because of changing comparative advantage.
Measurement error in the level of GDP could create artificially low persistence in growth rates, by leading to an underestimate of growth in one period and an overestimate in the next, or vice versa. However, we do not believe that measurement error explains low persistence. First, growth rates are probably not constructed by estimating GDP in subsequent periods -more likely, growth estimates are prepared first, and GDP in the second period is estimated from these growth estimates.
Second, we calculated persistence between periods that did not contain a common endpoint but instead 'Thio conoIoon u from the pooled regremon of the vecmr 101960-aS 01930-59 GI9)-291 on the vector (01930-59 G19-29 01870-991 whore each Oox-yy baa 23 elements represenong growth from xx toyy for each coustoy in the simple of 23 cOufloles. Because the penasleisee coefficient is neosidve to outhers in snsiul samples, this msmberjumps around from em set of periods oral one set of countries to another. For eumple. for the 16 industhal couneses in Maddison (1989) . the correlanons ictors his a4jacrnt penodi 870-1913. 1913-50. 1950-73. and 1973-81 ate .38. -.35. anti .46. Oar ozercixe is related so the analysis of Stocbsian (1988) The most straightforward explanation of the low persistence of growth rates would be that the country characteristics usually thought to determine growth are themselves not persistent. This section shows this explanation to be untenable: country characteristics are persistent. However, some aggregate index of policy variables could still have low persistence.7 To construct such an index, we use the variables shown in Figure 5 with a pooled time-series crosssection regression on 10 year averages. Table 3 shows regressions using the Barro (1991) variables with the exception of his PPI6ODEV (deviation of the relative price of investment from the sample mean), which is not available in individual decades for a sufficient sample. (Our government consumption variable does not exclude spending on defense and education as Barros did, due to lack of decade data on the latter.) We allow the intercepts to vary across decades. We also perform a 'Since the persisiefice of a lines, cornbrnanon of vanables dependa on the positive or neiweve covananee among them. it is possible for an aggiqaw uidcs of counoy policies to show lower persisicnee than any of in componensi.
second regression with a broader set of country characteristics. The fitted values from this regression (denoted Barro Index and Augmented Barro Index, respectively) are also far more persistent than growth rates, as shown in Figure 5 .
Rates of factor accumulation are much more persistent than growth razes. To compute an index of factor accumulation, we regressed aggregate growth (not per capita) on investment and labor force growth, using a sample of 115 countries which have data for all three decades. Figure 6 shows that investment, labor force growth, and the fitted value of growth predicted by the two are much more persistent than growth. The residuals from this regression can be interpreted, under certain assumptions, as the deviations of total factor productivity growth for each country from the global mean.C As shown in the graph, TFP growth rates are even less persistent than growth rates.
II) Shocks and Policies
This section argues that shocks, especially shocks to the terms of trade, are an important determinant of variations in growth razes over ten year periods, and that they can help account for low persistence.
Below we test how much of the variation in growth rates between countries can be statistically explained in terms of differences in policies, and how much is due to differences in shock variables, such as the terms of trade, external transfers, the change in the number of war related casualties per capita on national territory, and the presence of a debt crisis. We show that much of the variance in growth rates, even over periods as long as a decade, can be directly explained by shocks,° Moreover, Thc coefficiena of thc regrninion were as follows (1-nanioci in pienuthelen): connano term -.004 (-.8 I). on Invenmient share .07 (4.1), on labor force growth .65 (4.92), on a dwnzny for die 60's .030(9.0). on a dwnmy for the lOs .019 (4.99). R-sqssared was .23 and there wise 345 obnervaaona (decade averigen for 60n. lOs. and SOs for 115 cconiws). As is well known. the rogreinion can be innapreted as a cross-counay esamate of a producOon funcoa under die rether heroic asnsnspøona of connani capitel-osispue redos across counmes. ocOgenosss capital and labor growth. end connani pssenaiers across Consoles of the (Cobb-Douglai) production fusscnon. The coelfictent on labor growth is the esturrase of the labor shase, which isa reasonable .65. However, the isriplind enonsate of the capital-output tine ((I-65)/.073 -4.87) seems aso high.
'The finding diii shocks play an important role in growth at long hofleona is reminiscent of the onporsanee anerbutad so technology shocki an the real business cycle liternn.rre (e.g. Long and Plosser (1983) ).
shocks indirectly influence growth by changing policy variables. Thus the low persistence of shocks.
particularly external shocks, helps explain the low persistence of growth rates. Table 4 shows the simple correlations of three shock variables with growth rates.'° The variables are (1) the growth in dollar export prices times the initial share of exports in GDP minus the growth in import prices times the initial share of imports in GDP (terms of trade change); (2) the change in war casualties per capita on national temtosy; and (3) When shock variables are added to a regression with a small set of significant country characteristics from section I, they have substantial explanatory power compared to policy variables (Table 5) . We add the three variables from the previous paragraph and, for completeness, the per annum increase in official transfers. The partial R2 of the policy variables (enrollments, black market premium, M2/GDP) in the 1970s was .26 and of the shocks .14, while in the 1980$ the partial R2 of the policy variables was .10 versus .15 for shock variables.'2
The terms of trade effect is large and strongly significant in both periods. In the 1980$ a favorable terms of trade shock of I percentage point of GDP per annum raises the growth rate by .85 percentage point per annum. Recall that GDP is measured in constant prices, so there is no direct effect of a terms of trade shock on growth. This increase in growth is far larger than would be created simply through the effect of the increased income on savings. Even if all the shock passed 'Our thinkAng about proper definidorn of shock ennoble, beswflnnd from the rotated work of McCasthy aM Dhazasbwsr (1991) This isa duniosy vaflable meaasnng whether the debt in GDP run was above 50 peereasas 1990 Ia low aM middle-income counmes.
We do not have compasible sasUsdos for rich cawisnea. but in a' case no rich couney expenenemi an caramel debt crisza. Date on terms of aide, exporas. imposm, caramel debt, iM GOP are from the World Bank's lnrannil datebese: date on war cumsldes ate from Sivasd (1991).
The pardui 5' of a tory er pardoulng out a is the 5' of the regression of the coniponene of y aM x orthogonal as a. This is riot the rncvornensal it' aM the coniponeno do riot nun in the roast it'. Both petal 5¼ carbide the bUrial level of GOP.
into saving, and the rate of return Co capital were (optimistically) 20 percent, growth would only increase by .2 percentage points.
Factor movements are one potential explanation of large growth effects from terms of trade shocks.3 For example, labor or capita] might flow within the country to the sector receiving a favorable shock, capital might flow in from abroad to the export sector, or domestic savings might respond to improved export opportunities. In order to generate large growth effects through factor movements, however, factors and export demand must be elastic, and terms of trade shocks must be at least somewhat persistent. 'Another way to explain a large growth response to memo of trade nsovetssenm would be through two-gap models of the type popular in the 1960's, in which foreign exchange xx a separate biodmg canonist on the roonensy. A more modem explanation might be that the social value of foreign exchange to higher than the private value, perhaps because it is used to import macharms that carry rxtarrt,alines, as in De Long xrtd Surnmer (1991 ). Finally, the high coefficient could reflect a Keynesian aggregate demaed effect, which would be surpnsing at such a long period length.
The shocks help explain the low persistence of the observed growth rates. The correlation of the growth rates between the 1970s and 1980s is -.05 in this sample of countries, while the persistence of the component of predicted growth dependent on the non-shock variables was .63. The correlation between decades of the fined growth component due to shocks was -.08 and the persistence of the fined growth rates including all variables was •37l4
The shock variables influenced growth not only directly, but also indirectly, through policy variables. Table 6 reports regression of the black market premium on shock variables. War is associated with a high black market premium and favorable terms of trade changes with a lower premium.
This casts doubt on the widespread interpretation of the black market premium as an indicator of bad policies. If shock variables are omitted, estimates of the effect of the black market premium on growth will falsely attribute externally-induced adversity to policy. Table 5 demonstrates that the inclusion of shock variables in the regression reduces the coefficient and significance levels on the black market premium, especially in the 1980's, when it cuts the coefficient in half.
To summarize, shocks are important over decade-long periods, they help explain the difference between the persistence of actual and predicted growth, and they influence 'policy' variables, and thus estimates of the impact of policies.
III) Pers1st and Growth Theory
This section examines the interpretation of low persistence under two types of growth models.
In the first type of model, long-run growth depends on country characteristics. For example, in the AK model of Rebelo (1991) , growth depends on tax rates. In closed economy versions of Romer (1990) or Aghion and Howict (1992) , technological change, and therefore economic growth, depend
The esarnered parunwiors of thu 1970, were used re colculute the ptodscsed growth componemm for the 9805. Using the slope coficaenn from a pooled regression the decade canelaóons follow roughly the sante pauern growth -.05. policy .736. shocks -.426. toed v,jue .243.
on a countrys patent system and market size. In simple versions of these models, low persistence of growth rates implies that random shocks are important in determining the long-run path of output. In (he second type of model, which includes both the neoclassical model with exogenous technological change and some models of technological diffusion, growth is a world-wide process, and country characteristics determine the relative level of income. In these models, low persistence is consistent with shocks of any size, and shocks may play only a minor role in determining the long-run path of output, despite being an important determinant of variance in decade-long growth rates.
a. Modefr in Which Cowuvy Characteristics Determine Long-Run Growth
In a simple model in which country characteristics determine growth, the persistence coefficient can be interpreted as reflecting the magnitude of variance in underlying growth rates across countries relative to the variance of random shocks. To see this, denote the long-run growth rate associated with the policies of country i as g1. This can be represented as the world average growth rate, g, plus a country specific component e,, determined by country characteristics. Growth for country i in period t equals its underlying growth rate, plus a country-specific, period-specific shock. (A period specific aggregate shock could also be added, but would not affect the results.) Thus.
= g+e1÷e var(c,) = a var(e) =
(1)
The simplest assumption one can make is that , and e are independent normal variables, and is serially uncorrelated. Under this assumption, the persistence coefficient, denoted p, is E(g,-g)(g, _____ p
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This simple model of country fixed effects does not allow for changes in policy over time. However, since policies change only slowly, it may be a reasonable approximation over periods that are not too long. Under this model, the best forecast of a country's growth rate will be a weighted combination of its own past growth rate and the average growth rate of all other countries.0
Under this model of fixed country effects, low persistence bounds the potential R2 that can be achieved itt growth regressions. Even if policies were perfectly measured, and all policies and other factors affecting growth were taken into account, the expected R2 in a thirty-year growth regression would be only about 0.6. To see this, note that the expected R2 from regressing growth over n periods on a perfect measure of policies that determine the country's long-nm growth rate will be This simple model assumes shocks are serially uncorrelated. If there were negative senal correlation in the shocks, or if growth caine in spurts for deterministic reasons, persistence would be lower for given variance in underlying growth rates across countries. Thus, policies would play a more important role in determining the long-run path of output. It is not clear why one should expect substantial negative serial correlation over successive ten-year periods. For the spurts hypothesis, it is interesting to note that for the countries that have four decades of data in the Summers and Heston (1991) sample, on average around 60% of their growth from 1950 to 1988 is achieved in the fastest-growing decade within that period. However, it is not clear whether this is due to deterministic spurts of growth or to high random variation.
b. Models in which Worldwide Technological Progress Determines Lông-Run Growth
Under a different type of model, worldwide technological progress determines long-run growth and country characteristics determine steady state relative levels of income. This category includes not only the neoclassical model (Solow (1956) ), but also some models of technological diffusion. Suppose, for example, that technological progress at some rate g is generated in a few advanced countries by a process of the type described by Romer (1990) or Aghion and Howitt (1992) and then diffuses to other countries with lags of various lengths. Let diffusion follow the process B X(p) (A -B) where B is the level of technology in a backward country, p is the set of policies in that country, and A is the level of technology in the advanced countries. Thus counthes that are further behind have more learning potential, and countries with better policies learn faster. Setting BIB = A/A = g implies the steady state value of B/A will be X(p)/(g+X(p))." in this model, the relative steady state level of income is determined by policy, but except for those countries large and advanced enough to generate a significant share of world technology, long-run growth is exogenously determined. Under either a neoclassical model of capital accumulation or models of technological diffusion which 'For a sunlit, approach. sot Nelson and Phelps (1966) . Joo,vK aurd t,ach (1991), or enhzbib and RusOchini (1993) .
Incorporate advantages of backwardness, persistence depends on the distribution of countnes' incomes relative to their steady state income.
Adding an independent normal error term to a linearized version of these models allows persistence to be characterized. Ifthere is a wide dispersion of distances between countries initial incomes and their steady states, then transitional dynamics wIll dominate the effect of the random error term. The countries furthest below their steady state will grow the fastest. Relative growth rates will initially be highly persistent. However, as all countries approach their steady state levels of income, persistence will fall because transitional dynamics will become less important relative to the random error term. Asymptotically countries will converge to an ergodic distribution around the steady state, in which persistence will be negative since countries which receive a positive random shock one period will tend to fall back towards the steady state the next period. where YLs denotes log income of country i at time t.
y denotes steady state income, is a random shock, and v E (0,1) measures the speed of adjustment to the steady state, which depends on a host of parameters, including the capital share.
Thus growth between and t+l, denoted g,, equals v(,y-y.)+s1. Iterating, = v(y '-(y.+v(y '-y1) + + Given this, it is straightforward to write persistence as ' We consider the impact of shocks to income, but shocks to policy would have similar consequences. since these alter the stonily state level of income end 5anscaonaJ dyiwnics me dcscrnuoad by the difference between nitisl end the steady state level of income.
See Bane mel 5a1o-i-Mnztm (1992) . n corresponds to l-c°in their riounon. This osasisple etsumea that all counirses have the some -stonily state sod iltat there is no exogenous tecMologtcal pmgtess. bus it would be sititgborwsrd 50 genernlaze site nodel. p= ______ (9) a,I(1 _v2)cr+a
Since the numerator increases more than proportionally in o2 and the denominator increases less than proportionally in 2, persistence increases with the cross-section variance of income. Barro and Sala-i-Martin show that as t goes to infinity, the cross-section variance monotonicaIly9 approaches the steady state value, o = a / (2v-v2). Thus if the initial cross-section vath.nce is greater than its steady state value, persistence will decline over time. Persistence is asymptotically negative, since the limit of the covariance between a countty's growth at t and at t+ I is 'This ajunus an infinbe number of counthe3. Withs finite number of counmu petisianue wowd be a rsaiom sortable. 2-v which must be negative.
Note that even if the random shocks are arbitrarily small, these models predict that persistence will asymptotically become negative. Under this model, a country's time path of income could be determined almost completely by worldwide technological change and its policies, but if it were close to its steady state income a large percentage of the time series variance in its growth rate would be explained by random shocks. In this case the growth rate would just represent fluctuations around a steady state income.
This model could be generalized by allowing each country to have its own steady state level of income depending on policies, and by allowing for exogenous technological change. In this case, persistence depends not on variance of income, but on variance in the gap between actual income and steady state income relative to the level of technology. If countries vary greatly in their distance from their relative steady states, persistence will be high. The countries far below their relative steady state income will initially have persistently high growth rates. As they approach the steady state.
their growth rate will fall.
Asymptotically, there is a sharp distinction between models in which country characteristics determine long-run growth and models in which country characteristics determine relative steady state income. However, if countries are far from their steady states, models in which country characteristics determine income look similar to those in which country characteristics determine growth rates.
One difficulty with this type of model is that it does not explain why we observe countries outside the ergodic distribution around the steady state. Barro and Sala-i-Martin have suggested countnes may be outside this distribution due to large, infrequent shocks, such as wars, depressions, or industrial revolutions. Such shocks could plausibly affect only a subset of counthes, thus creating a wide distribution of ratios of actual to steady state relative income.
This model has several testable implications for persistence. It predicts high and declining persistence following a large shock that displaces countries or regions differing distances from their steady states. It predicts low persistence in regions which are similar distances away from their steady states, which might plausibly be regions of a country. Finally, it predicts that controlling for initial income should generate very low persistence in samples of regions with similar steady states, since in these models persistence is due to transition dynamics.
Results from U.S. states and European provinces seem consistent with the predictions of the model, although the evidence is far from decisive. Negative persistence is much more common among states than among countries, as would be expected if states are more likely than countries to be similar distances away from their steady states, Growth rates of personal per capita income in the U.S. states, shown in Table 7 , have negative persistence from the 20's to the 30's. probably reflecting the large shocks of the collapse of agricultural prices in the 20's and the Great Depression of the 3D's, which adversely affected the poorest states which had been growing most quickly. In the next 3 decades, persistence was positive (although weaker between the 40's and 50's). Persistence then is zero between the 60's and 70's, and negative between the 70's and 80's, as would make sense if U.S.
states were close to their steady states by then. Controlling for initial income makes persistence consistently low or negative, as predicted by the neoclassical models.
Data from 73 European provinces (covering Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) provides further support for the model. Persistence across e8a,To and Saia+Manm (1991) fInd it to be important to conuol (or od shocks in their study of conver5eoce antong the U.S. stutos.
We ire gratcitsi to Robert Bamo (or kindiy sharing the datu set on U.S. stunu and Eiuopeinprootncu.
subsequent decades from the 50's to the 80's is low, with negative persistence again observed for the 80's. Controlling for initial income makes persistence even lower. However, it is difficult to explain why persistence was low from the 1950's to 1960's, since different European countries were probablydifferent distances away from their steady state then.
We also have a small amount of regional data from developing countries. The data is on gross rather than per capita product for provinces in China, India, and Indonesia, and on per capita product for provinces in Colombia.n We found negative persistence for 25 Chinese provinces across subsequent periods of 1952-63, 1963-74, and 1974-85 , negative persistence for 24 Colombian provinces for periods of 1950-60, 1960-70, 1970-80, and 1980-90, and Just as these models predict high persistence following a large shock to the income of a group of countries, such as a war, they predict high persistence following a large shock to the policies of a country, such as a major policy reform. As mentioned earlier, a group of East Asian countries and Botswana had consistently high growth. It seems plausible that many of them adopted policies at the beginning of the period that led to steady state levels of income far above their initial income levels.
On the other hand, few countries were consistent bad performers. This may indicate that countries with high levels of income do not often change to policies that give them a low level of steady state income.
The 80s hcr ,s just 1980-55.
The da souitcs u Gocrnmem of India (1984) . Ceiin.i Burtau of sstnsocs of 1ndoias,a (various yevs), Stab Siaasncal Burouu of China Cardersas es al. (1992) for Colombia.
In sum, under the simplest model in which country characteristics determine long run growth rates, low persistence implies that there are large random shocks. This, in turn, implies that such theories, if correct, leave much of growth unexplained, and that a country's income level will be determined in large part by its luck in the past. These models could be reconciled with a dominant role for policy in determining the long-run path of income if there were large negative serial correlation in shocks, if growth caine in spurts, or if policies changed rapidly. On the other hand.
under models in which growth is determined by a worldwide process of technological change and by transitional dynamics, luck may determine only fluctuations in income around a long run trend.
Under these models, low persistence implies that countries must be at similar enough distances from their steady states that shocks are important relative to transitional dynamics. Non-negative persistence implies that countries must not yet be in an ergodic distribution around their steady states.
Conclusion
Relative growth rates of output per worker across countries are not very persistent. This low persistence is robust to choice of sample, is not an artefact of changes in oil prices or of agricultural disturbances, and it extends over long periods. In contrast to growth rates themselves, the country characteristics which are often thought of as determinants of growth are highly persistent. Shocks, especially terms of trade shocks, statistically explain as much of the variance in growth rates over 10 year periods as do country policies.
Models in which country characteristics determine long-run growth can be reconciled to these facts only if they generate spurts in growth or if there are large random shocks. In contrast, models in which worldwide technological change determines long-run growth predict low persistence if countries are near the steady state relative income levels determined by their policies. Vote: G,-owth razes are leas-squarts growth per worker for each coviizry for penods shove The three letter World Bank code., for counny names, which are also used in Summers and Heston (199/) and Barro and Wolf (1989) . are used for each poEnt. 
